> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.astral.global/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# What You Are Trusting

> Honest accounting of current assumptions and the path forward

<Note>**Research Preview** — APIs may change. [GitHub](https://github.com/AstralProtocol)</Note>

# What you are trusting

We're transparent about what's verified and what's assumed because trust is the product. This page gives an honest accounting of the current trust assumptions and where they're headed.

## Current trust assumptions

| Assumption                                | Status                         | Notes                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| ----------------------------------------- | ------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| TEE executes code correctly               | Verified **under attestation** | EigenCompute provides hardware attestation; continuous attested deployment is target-state (see below)                                                                                      |
| Service runs under continuous attestation | **Not yet**                    | Demonstrated in test deployments; not continuously funded today                                                                                                                             |
| Astral operates service honestly          | Required                       | Single operator in the Research Preview                                                                                                                                                     |
| Signing key held securely in TEE          | Verified **under attestation** | Intended to be non-extractable when the enclave is attested                                                                                                                                 |
| Input locations are truthful              | **Depends on the input**       | Raw coordinates are trust-based; a [location proof](/concepts/location-proofs) backs the input with evaluable evidence — available today (ProofMode end to end; other plugins experimental) |

The Research Preview uses a **centralized trust model**: a single service with a known signer, designed to run inside a TEE. The TEE provides execution attestation, and deterministic operations ensure reproducibility. But you are trusting Astral to operate the service honestly.

<Warning>
  **Deployment status.** Astral has run the service on real TEE hardware in test deployments, but does not currently fund continuous operation on attested hardware. On the hosted staging service today, a valid signature proves that a key Astral controls produced the result — not yet that an independently attested enclave did. This is the gap between "signed by a key" and "signed by an attested enclave," and we'd rather state it plainly. If you want to evaluate Astral against real TEEs, reach out at [contact@astral.global](mailto:contact@astral.global).
</Warning>

## Raw location inputs are trust-based — location proofs change that

If you pass **raw coordinates** to Astral, you are trusting they're honest. GPS is spoofable; a user can claim to be anywhere. A signed result over raw coordinates proves that *if* the user was at location A, *then* they were within 500m of location B — not that they were actually at A.

This is exactly what [location proofs](/concepts/location-proofs) address, and they exist today. Instead of bare coordinates, you submit a claim backed by evidence — stamps from one or more [proof-of-location systems](/concepts/pol-systems). Astral evaluates that evidence and returns a [credibility vector](/concepts/location-proof-evaluation). It can't make weak evidence strong, but it turns "trust the input" into "weigh the evidence and the evaluation." ProofMode works end to end now; other plugins are experimental, with interfaces defined (we're keen to develop more with partners — [get in touch](mailto:contact@astral.global)).

**Be direct with your users**: if you rely on raw coordinates rather than location proofs, the location data is trust-based — say so.

## What verification buys you today

Even with these assumptions, verifiable computation is meaningful:

* **The computation is correct.** You know the spatial relationship was evaluated faithfully, not fabricated.
* **The inputs are recorded.** `inputRefs` let you audit which data went into the computation.
* **The result is tamper-evident.** The signature proves the output was produced by Astral's key and hasn't been altered since. Under attestation, it further proves the output came from the attested environment.

This is substantially better than trusting an opaque API that returns `true` or `false` with no proof.

## The path forward

<Steps>
  <Step title="AVS Consensus">
    Multiple independent operators run the computation. Results must match to be accepted. No single operator can lie.
  </Step>

  <Step title="ZK Proofs">
    Cryptographic proof that the computation was correct. Verifiable by anyone without trusting the prover.
  </Step>

  <Step title="Decentralized Signers">
    Multi-party computation for result signing. No single party holds the full key.
  </Step>

  <Step title="Location Proof Integration">
    Evidence-based location claims replace raw GPS. Multiple corroborating stamps make spoofing harder.
  </Step>
</Steps>

Each enhancement reduces the trust surface. AVS consensus removes the single-operator assumption. ZK proofs make verification independent of hardware trust. Decentralized signers eliminate the single key. Location proofs address the input honesty gap.

<Card title="Next: Security considerations" icon="arrow-right" href="/trust-model/security">
  Threat model, known limitations, and responsible disclosure
</Card>